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User-centric identity management systems are 
gaining momentum as concerns about Big Tech and Big 
Government rise. Many of these systems are framed as 
offering Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI). Yet, competing 
appropriation and the social embedding of SSI have 
resulted in diverging interpretations. These vague and 
value-laden interpretations can damage the public 
discourse and risk misrepresenting values and 
affordances that technology offers to users. To unpack 
the various social and technical understandings of SSI, 
we adopt an ‘interpretive flexibility’ lens. Based on a 
qualitative inductive interview study, we find that SSI’s 
interpretation is strongly mediated by surrounding 
institutional properties. Our study helps to better 
navigate these different perceptions and highlights the 
need for a multidimensional framework that can 
improve the understanding of complex socio-technical 
systems for digital government practitioners, 
researchers, and policy-makers. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Electronic identification is essential for the digital 
interaction between parties who do not know or trust 
each other [1]. Current digital identity systems give rise 
to numerous privacy and security concerns regarding the 
aggregation of personal data. For electronic services 
provided by governments, citizen’s identity data are 
mostly stored in centralized silos. This architecture is 
vulnerable to cybercrimes, such as identity theft and 
personal data misuse [2]. 
In response to these risks, there is a nascent demand 
for a decentralized digital identity paradigm that 
upholds users’ privacy rights and does not rely on 
centralized databases. This demand led to decentralized 
identity schemes and distributed ledger technology 
(DLT) becoming a noticeable trend [3, 4]. Members of 
digital identity communities on the Internet began 
promoting this emancipatory paradigm under the 
heading of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) [5, 6]. It 
promises users the power to ‘own’ their identities [7]. 
Although SSI projects do not all use the same 
technologies, there are three particular components 
commonly associated with SSI’s principles: 
decentralized identifiers (DIDs), an alternative to static 
identifiers like social security and credit card numbers 
[8]; verifiable credentials (VCs), a new type of digital 
certificate stored in user-controlled wallet apps that can 
be used for a broad array of identity documents [9]; and 
a decentralized public key infrastructure (PKI), based 
on a DLT, such as blockchain PKI [4]. 
Because of SSI’s common association with value-
laden technologies like blockchain [10], it is often 
caught up with DLT-related hype, idiosyncratic visions 
of a fully decentralized world, and the vaguely defined 
notion of self-sovereignty [3, 11]. In fact, the competing 
appropriation and the social embedding of SSI results in 
a range of different interpretations among stakeholders, 
such as public sector institutions or private companies. 
Not only are terms like self-sovereignty or data 
sovereignty difficult to grasp, but they are also being 
diagnosed as ‘data dysphoria’ in order to connotate a 
“type of unease manifest in cyberspace” based on the 
perceived retreat or failure of social mechanisms and 
institutions [12]. This suggests that even from an 
institutional perspective, understandings on 





decentralized paradigms, like SSI, seem to differ. It 
appears that particularly libertarian societies gravitate 
towards decentralized technologies that ‘liberate’ 
citizens from centralization and control [13]. However, 
the decentralization of digital identity management 
systems also starts to attract the interest of societies that 
place a higher trust in institutions. The European Union 
(EU), for instance, published a new legal proposal on a 
“trusted and secure European e-ID” which foresees the 
introduction of a European Digital Identity Wallet [14].  
In short, the ambiguity of SSI’s technical 
implementations [15], and its manifold social 
interpretations make SSI capable to be shaped by the 
flexible interests of social actors that are interacting with 
this set of technologies. Yet, the undefined and, 
sometimes misleadingly, value-laden discourse about 
SSI can damage public understandings, as its 
contestations go beyond mere confusion. We thus 
formulated the following research question: How is SSI 
shaped by social actors, technical constraints and the 
underlying institutional context? 
To answer our research question and navigate 
through the various understandings of SSI on a social, 
technical and institutional level, we conduct a 
qualitative inductive analysis grounded in expert 
interviews and technical documentation. It is important 
to note that the use of SSI is not restricted to the digital 
identification of individuals by public authorities. 
‘Digital identity’ is an umbrella term that can express 
identity attributes of citizens, organizations, and even 
objects in the field of IoT. Accordingly, SSI is 
applicable to the identification of both human and non-
human agents. This paper, however, focusses on the use 
of SSI by governmental agencies in the context of 
identifying individuals.  
From a theoretical point of view, we draw on 
interpretive flexibility (IF) – a core concept of the Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach [16, 17]. 
Our primary objective is to map social and technical 
domains of SSI along Doherty et al.’s [18] model of 
interpretive flexibility. Given the contextual importance 
for SSI’s interpretive flexibility, we seek to extend 
Doherty et al.’s model [18] to account for so-called 
institutional properties introduced by Orlikowski [19]. 
The study offers contributions to both theory and 
practice. From a theory perspective, this paper extends 
the IF model to include institutional properties. 
Implications for practice are provided by the findings 
which offer a foundation to understand and discuss SSI. 
The paper is structured as follows. To clarify the 
relevance of IF for digital government, we first elaborate 
on the development of electronic identification systems 
as a socio-technical artifact. We subsequently provide 
different possible socio-political interpretations of SSI 
and its technical operationalization. We then analyze 
our data through the theoretical lens of IF and the 
concept of institutional properties. Finally, we discuss 
our results, present the extended model on IF, and 
conclude. 
2. Background and Theoretical Lens 
2.1. From centralized e-ID to SSI 
The management of public service interactions 
between citizens and public administrations typically 
relies on citizens’ identity information, such as name, 
date of birth, address or nationality. Since a few 
decades, governments transitioned from paper-based 
systems to electronic means of identification [20]. The 
growing demand for user identification via electronic 
interfaces is motivated by the objective to mitigate 
identity theft and to enable government agencies to 
collaborate more efficiently. For many governments, the 
introduction of electronic identification systems is also 
a crucial step towards a more transparent, trustworthy 
and legitimate information society more generally [21].  
Yet, the remote interaction between users and 
public administrations comes with challenges regarding 
security, confidentiality, and the authentication of users. 
At the same time, the increasing digital cooperation of 
state agencies through a connected web of databases, the 
so-called vertical and horizontal integration stage of 
digital government development [22] depends on the 
exchange of sensitive data. This results in a paradox 
where electronic identification systems enhance 
security on the one hand, but may compromise users’ 
privacy on the other. Eventually, data collection, cross-
referencing, and the aggregation of metadata could lead 
to surveillance by the state or third parties [23].  
Here, the developments and use of open standards, 
cryptographic protocols, and decentralized technologies 
represent significant efforts to address this dilemma. 
With the advent of DLT, new paradigms of 
decentralized identity or Self-Sovereign Identity entered 
the space of identity management [3, 4]. At the same 
time, electronic identification systems in digital 
government are steadily at the intersection of policy 
considerations and technical design. Therefore, they are 
subject to debates that are shaped by stakeholder’s 
interpretations of the artefact in question. In addition, 
complex political dynamics, budget realities, path 
dependencies and the lack of political awareness are 
recognized factors that can affect the use of novel 
technologies in the public sector [21, 24, 25]. This gap 
between politics and technology emphasizes the 
importance of conceptual meanings around innovation 
and a commonly shared understanding of technology. 
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2.2. SSI’s technical and social ambiguity 
Despite its technical heterogeneity, there are certain 
technical features that are frequently observed with SSI. 
Among those are DIDs, which allow users to interact 
with service providers via end-to-end encrypted 
communication without an intermediary registrar or 
account provider [8]. Another associated technical 
building block of SSI are VCs. VCs are an advanced 
machine-verifiable and cryptographically secure type of 
digital certificates, which are characterized by an 
issuer’s digital signature. These types of credentials can 
be stored, for instance, on a user’s device in a so-called 
‘digital wallet’ and used for a broad array of identity 
documents [9]. Most digital wallets that are part of an 
SSI solution store either digital assets, identity 
information or both of them [15]. The wallet’s holdings 
can be registered on DLT (which can include hashes of 
personally identifiable information), hence SSI is often 
described as “blockchain-based identity” [26]. Finally, 
there is a third type of wallet which neither stores 
cryptographic assets nor does it use VCs. Suffice to say, 
there is not yet an orthodox, technical definition for SSI 
solutions. It is thus viewed as “overwhelmingly 
confusing” by technical experts [3, 26]. From a 
technical point of view, SSI standards are still under 
development, which can pose a challenge to the 
implementation of mature SSI solutions. Yet, given that 
this paper is nor a technical evaluation of design options 
or attributes of SSI, the subsequent arguments engage 
with SSI’s technological “features” [27] on a high-level 
presentation.  
The next observation is socio-political and regards 
SSI as set of inconclusive socio-ethical principles. The 
conception of a self-sovereign identity or a sovereign 
individual did not emerge from philosophy, legal 
theory, or political science texts; instead, it came from 
blog posts, magazines, and Internet forums of software 
developers. Such forums defined SSI as a set of ethical 
principles and an idealistic vision in which individuals 
become “rulers of their own identity” [5]. Traditionally, 
sovereignty is conceived as an exceptional power, not 
something possessed by all [28]: the dominion of God, 
the Crown or the State are examples of such sovereign. 
Self-sovereignty, by contrast, denotes an individual’s 
ability to control the digital exchange of assets and 
personal information [5, 7].  
In the academic literature, Cheesman [11] 
identified identity ‘ownership’ and individual 
empowerment as common rhetorical themes: SSI 
putatively “removes the need for powerful, centralized 
institutional structures by giving individuals control and 
ownership of their identity information.” Specifically, 
she argued that because the diverse ways in which 
individuals use digital identity technologies cannot be 
determined in advance, SSI could potentially empower 
disenfranchised individuals, yet it could also extend 
administrative powers and strengthen the control of 
bureaucracies. The SSI terminology entails an 
idiosyncratic conception of sovereignty; and self-
sovereignty is in turn linked to other informal notions 
like data sovereignty, digital identity ownership, and 
personal data ownership [29, 30]. Indeed, proponents of 
SSI tend to appreciate technical features, yet depreciate 
“moral semantics”; hence the prevalence of simple 
narratives that posit SSI as ‘good’ and Big Tech or 
governments as ‘bad’ [30]. Halpin [31] suggests that the 
“cultish” libertarian proponents of SSI overlook ethical 
problems. He coined the term “cryptography theatre” to 
mock the use of cryptography to allay users’ concerns. 
Zwitter et al. [29] acknowledged that technologies 
associated with SSI have potential; yet they also 
identified “a clear need” for critical policy decisions that 
affect the design and implementation of SSI systems. 
2.3. The Social Construction of Technology 
The broad school of the Social Shaping of 
Technology (SST) is concerned with the design and 
development of technologies – a process that is, aside 
from technical considerations, largely patterned by 
social factors [32]. As such, SST views innovation as a 
“garden of forking paths” [32] determined by both a 
technical dimension – composed of ‘constraints’ or 
‘affordances’, and a social dimension – impacted by 
stakeholders and negotiations between them.” 
The prevailing rationale of this school is reflected 
in its seceding approaches, – namely, actor-network 
theory (ANT), sociotechnical systems theory, and the 
social construction of technology (SCOT). The SCOT 
approach seeks to understand technical developments 
and to highlight the social constructivist component 
thereof [16]. SCOT contains the concept of interpretive 
flexibility (IF) – the ability of a given technical artefact 
to symbolize “different things to different actors” [33]. 
IF allows different social groups to associate different 
meanings to a technology. For information systems, 
although the physical properties ensure the presence of 
clear “boundary conditions” on usage in the technical 
domain, the social domain remains unaccounted for in 
positivist approaches [34]. Therefore, information 
systems ought to be analyzed in constructivist terms, 
both in their technical and social domains. Arguing that 
little scholarly attention has been given to how a 
system’s technical specifications may limit its 
interpretive flexibility, Doherty et al. [18] developed a 
re-conceptualization of IF in order to analyze the 
potential to tailor a given information system (Figure 1). 
Their model describes how stakeholders construct 
different understandings of the same artefact, and how 
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its technical characteristics provide functional 
boundaries on the system’s ability to be interpreted 
flexibly. To delineate upper and lower limits with 
regards to these boundaries, Doherty et al. [18] 
introduce two confronting constraints. On one end of the 
spectrum are enforcing constraints – which are 
“mandatory” technical features, and thus deemed 
essential for the system’s functionality. At the opposite 
end of the spectrum are proscribing constraints – 
representing functions that do not exist or cannot be 
used. 
2.4. Structural Studies of Technology 
In the advent of Structuration Theory, foundational 
studies established reciprocal links between structures 
and social agents without giving primacy to either [17, 
19]. This theoretical foundation was employed by 
organizational researchers studying the relationship 
between technology and social structures. Orlikowksi 
[19] conceived technology as fundamentally dual. Her 
model (Figure 2) reflects this duality: technology is 
shaped by human agents (A), and in turn, influences the 
actions and behavior of users (B). Orlikowksi also 
considered institutional properties of organizations 
(e.g., budgets, business strategies, culture, expertise, 
regulation, etc.), as having an influence on humans’ 
interaction with technology (C). She suggested that 
technology has consequences on institutional properties 
by reinforcing/transforming the status quo (D). 
In information systems research, studies of 
technology do not strictly account for the IF of technical 
constraints [35]. The ones that do take a narrow 
organizational perspective without incorporating the 
impact of institutional properties as suggested by 
Orlikowski [19]. Although Doherty et al. [18] ground 
their model of IF in Orlikowski’s organizational 
perspectives, the approach focuses exclusively on the 
interpretations of stakeholder groups and functional 
boundaries. For a socio-technical construct like SSI, the 
institutional properties may be a crucial factor to 
account for [11, 29]. Studying IF through a more holistic 
lens – one that includes stakeholders, technical 
constraints, and institutional properties – serves to 
answer our research question. 
3. Method 
We followed a qualitative inductive approach to 
match our data-driven analysis. The inductive, 
qualitative analysis method consisted of a qualitative 
inductive interview study [36] with a supporting 
document analysis.  
As part of our in-depth interview study, we 
conducted 20 semi-structured interviews with 
knowledgeable experts on credential and identity 
management. We conducted interviews to account for 
the novelty of SSI and the subsequent scarce amount of 
information available on SSI’s implementation, best-
practices, and interpretations. The study, executed in the 
context of a project with Luxembourg’s Ministry for 
Digitalization, spanned over a period of five months. 
The composition of stakeholders consisted of seven 
participants that worked in for-profit companies, seven 
government officials, four interviewees that worked in 
non-profit organizations, and two researchers. 
Importantly, there is no conflict of interest with the 
interviewed researchers or overlap with the author team. 
Interviews were held individually via videoconference 
and lasted for about 60 minutes. The participants came 
from Europe, North America, the United Kingdom and 
Australia. While the technical boundaries of SSI were 
discussed with interviewees from all continents, the 
social and institutional properties mainly focused on the 
European context. 
To study the various understandings and technical 
implementations of SSI, we further analyzed nine 
whitepapers of eight different solution providers and 
designers: SelfKey Foundation [37], Ontology [38], 
Procivis AG [39], Esatus [40], German Chancellery 
[41], Sovrin Foundation [7], Microsoft [42] and the 
Alastria Association Network Consortium [43]. 
Through the lens of Doherty et al.’s model [18], we 
analyzed both the social and technical domains of SSI. 
With the objective to identify patterns and answer our 
Figure 1. Model of interpretive flexibility 
























research question along the lines of our theoretical 
framework, we followed the conventional stages of 
open, axial, and selective coding [44]. We coded our 
data using the qualitative analysis software MAXQDA 
[45]. In the first open coding phase, we analyzed 
whitepapers and interviews individually by assigning 
initial conceptual labels. In the second stage, the axial 
coding phase, we clustered codes across sources, 
elevating them to higher-levels themes. Specifically, we 
began separating the technical from the social domain, 
and congregated codes along technological features, 
social dimensions, and institutional contextual factors. 
The final process of coding aimed at identifying and 
creating overarching categories to group the matching 
themes based on our theoretical lens of the IF model. 
We used selective coding to identify properties of SSI 
and deduce social dimensions throughout the existing 
categories and subcategories [44]. In the technical 
domain, we sought to identify common technical 
specifications and constraints of the individual SSI 
projects. Based on Doherty et al.’s model of IF [18], we 
matched our cluster of codes with relevant elements of 
the model, such as ‘stakeholders’, ‘interpretations’, or 
‘functional boundaries’. 
 To structure our findings for SSI’s IF in the social 
domain, we relied on Bannister and Connolly’s 
taxonomy of public sector values of ICT that can be 
either duty oriented, service oriented or socially 
oriented [46]. We classified every stakeholder group’s 
interpretation of SSI along each value orientation. We 
further observed a certain congruence with Orlikowki’s 
[34] institutional properties, as our data approached an 
association between the institutional context and 
stakeholders’ interpretations’ of SSI. 
4. Findings 
We first analyzed our data from a technical and 
social (stakeholder) perspective. The technical IF of SSI 
is limited by functional boundaries consisting of both 
enforcing constraints and proscribing constraints. For 
the social domain, we discovered that the social 
interpretive flexibility is particularly pronounced in duty 
and socially oriented values of SSI. Our data analysis 
revealed a third, institutional dimension as SSI’s social 
IF is subject to institutional properties – consisting of 
both organizational dimensions and environmental 
pressures. 
4.1. Functional boundaries 
As anticipated within the technical literature on SSI 
[4], its operationalizations in practice diverge 
significantly. Our interview data revealed that solutions 
labelled ‘SSI’ may be composed of numerous technical 
“features” [27]. Our results witnessed a great variety of 
operationalizations ranging from and between the use of 
crypto-assets, Verifiable Credentials (VCs), on-chain 
identifiers, Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs), and DLT-
based public key infrastructure (PKI) to none of these. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the different 
implementations of SSI. Solutions discussed in 
interviews are marked with an asterisk (*). While there 
is not yet an industry-standard definition on technical 
features of SSI, we observed a common denominator in 
the form of VCs, DIDs and DLT-based PKIs. 
To ensure personal identity data management, a 
software application to hold credentials that runs on a 
users’ hardware or a server in the cloud is essential. In 
other words, a mandatory technical building block we 
identified is a digital wallet. A digital wallet stores a 
user’s private keys and can be used to encrypt messages 
or prove ownership of a VC. It typically contains a 
user’s digital credential, such as VCs, DIDs or any other 
form of machine-verifiable document. While a digital 
wallet is as mandatory common denominator for an 
enforcing constraint [18], some ‘outlier’ SSI solutions 
exhibit unique enforcing constraints. For instance, the 
SelfKey Foundation introduced crypto assets (native 
token, KEY) for its SSI ecosystem through a public 
token sale. The purpose of KEY is essential because 
certain actions on the SelfKey network require an 
exchange of the token and others will involve placing 
KEY in a “locked contract” (e.g., to access the network). 
SelfKey’s native token, KEY, is indeed an enforcing 
constraint because it is mandatory for the network’s 
overall functionality. 
The proscribing constraints relate to functionalities 






























































esatus AG SeLF  X X   X X 
Findy Coop.* Findy  X X   X  
Streetcred ID Inc. Trinsic  X X   X X 
Evernym Inc.* Evernym  X X   X X 
Sovrin Fdn. * Sovrin  X X   X X 
Main Incubator GmbH IDunion  X X   X X 
Alastria Consortium ID Alastria  X   X X X 
Microsoft ION  X   X X X 
Ontology Ontology X X  X X X X 
SelfKey Fdn. SelfKey X X  X X X X 
Procivis AG eID+        
Verifiable Cred.Ltd.*   X      
Table 1. Different implementations of SSI 
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interview data revealed that there is a recurring aversion 
towards centralized data storages and siloed databases. 
Thus, SSI seeks to store identity data in a decentralized 
fashion. Generally, decentralized storage is associated 
with the use of DLT [10]. While we could not confirm a 
uniform implementation of SSI on DLT-based PKIs, 
there is a strong consensus towards ‘concepts of 
decentralization’ and reducing the need of interaction 
between the identity or credential issuer, the user, and 
the service provider. For instance, some SSI 
implementations rely on a PKI with certificate 
authorities. Such certificate-based solutions do not use 
DLT-based PKIs, but they still store the certificates in a 
decentralized manner on the users’ end devices. Other 
solutions neither rely on a DLT nor on certificate 
authorities, but by offering digital mobile wallets to 
users these schemes are ultimately decentralized. A 
proscribing constraint would thus be a system that 
neither uses DLT-based PKIs nor certificate authorities, 
and which does thus not allow for the storage of data 
outside the realms of one specific institution. This 
architecture design would inherently be at odds with the 
objective of SSI. 
4.2. The social interpretive flexibility 
We clustered the various interpretations of SSI 
along Bannister and Connolly’s [46] taxonomy of 
public sector values (Table 2). The framework defines 
three types of values that typically underpin digital 
government services. Duty oriented values encompass 
the duty-bound aspects and mandates of public officials 
as servants to the state. Service oriented values for 
digital government incorporate values, such as 
efficiency, that seek to ensure high standards of services 
to citizens. Finally, socially oriented values cover a 
wider spectrum of political and social goals to generate 
added value to citizens and further social integration.  
With regard to duty oriented SSI values, experts 
from not-for-profit and for-profit organizations viewed 
SSI as a possibility to re-establish and increase trust in 
central institutions as a “key enabler to enforce […] 
democratic principles.” Public officials, on the other 
hand, emphasized the government’s responsibility to 
have a “duty of care” over users and to protect long term 
needs, such as “privacy”, “social cohesion” and even 
“life goals” of citizens against impulsive needs, such as 
“efficiency” and “convenience.”  
With regard to service oriented values, all 
stakeholder groups expressed a positive feeling towards 
increased user convenience generated by SSI, in 
particular through the use of self-managed digital 
wallets on users’ mobile devices. Experts from not-for-
profit and for-profit organizations strongly highlighted 
increased efficiency and personal data management as 
crucial benefits of SSI. 
A great variety of interpretations of SSI emerged 
among socially oriented values. We observed 
contestations among stakeholders particularly in aspects 
regarding data ownership, digital exclusion and 
decentralization. While data ownership was promised 
or promoted by almost all SSI whitepapers and private 
sector organizations, researchers and public officials 
judged the pledge for ownership as a “misconception 
about personal data […] propagated by SSI 
proponents.” Another interviewee emphasized that there 
is “no such thing as the owner of personal data and 
GDPR does not even use this concept.” Indeed, legally 
the idea ownership of data is not covered under the 
current regulatory regime. While the idea of 
‘reappropriating’ data to users is heavily disputed, all 
stakeholders agreed that SSI would enable user control, 
thereby ensuring an individual’s ability to control the 
exchange, disclosure and restriction of identity data.  
Socially oriented values also encompass the 
accessibility of ICT for the general public in order to 
prevent digital exclusion. In this context, researchers 
and government officials shared the view that SSI would 
require high digital literacy among users because it 
presupposes the individual’s capability of managing and 
controlling one’s own identity data. Both groups 
questioned whether all individuals could be entrusted 
with the ability of self-management and critical 
reasoning to assess when to share which data or restrict 
access to whom. Similarly, researchers argued that SSI 
requires internet access, the possession of an electronic 
device, and in some cases even a smartphone with 
biometric authentication methods. Contrarily, 
stakeholders from not-for-profit and for-profit 
organizations pronounced the social inclusiveness of 
SSI – addressing individuals that are unable to prove 
their identity in “paper-based, nationally driven, 
government identity systems.” On the socially oriented 
 Researchers Not-for-profit For-profit Government officials 
Duty oriented  - Trust in institutions - Trust in institutions - Duty of care for citizens 
Service oriented 
- User convenience - User convenience 
- User data management 
- Efficiency 
- User convenience 
- User data management 
- Efficiency 
- User convenience 
Socially oriented 
- Data control 
- Digital Exclusion 
- ‘Data ownership’ 
- Social inclusion 
- ‘Data ownership’ 
- Social inclusion 
- Data control 
- Digital Exclusion 
- Decentralization 
Table 2. Overview of the interpretive flexibility interpretive flexibility in the social domain of SSI  
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value of decentralization, some governmental actors 
perceived SSI as a “principle-based” construct that lacks 
trust and credibility. This view was based on the duality 
of SSI that incorporates a libertarian idealism on the one 
side, while calling for government-issued credentials 
and thus relying on a centralized authority on the other. 
In sum, SSI is interpreted flexibly in the social domain. 
This leads to confusion about SSI as a novel, electronic 
identity paradigm. 
4.3. Underlying institutional properties 
 The analysis of our data revealed that human 
agents and their interpretation of socio-technical 
artefacts are subject to a variety of institutional 
properties. Following Orlikwoski [19], we categorized 
these in terms of endogenous organizational dimensions 
(ODs) such as business strategies, ideology, culture or 
standard operating procedures, as well as exogenous 
environmental pressures (EPs) such as regulations, 
vendor strategies, or state of knowledge about 
technology. We present our findings in Table 3 and 
indicate the strength of the impact of each institutional 
property on the social groups’ interpretations of SSI 
with the numbers 1 (low impact) to 4 (high impact). It is 
noteworthy that the analysis of our data showed that 
researchers as a stakeholder group are not impacted by 
institutional properties. The reason for this may be due 
to researchers, working on a scientific basis, tend to 
assess IT artefacts objectively and independently from 
cultural or political influence. 
 For the ODs, we identified two prevalent 
institutional properties: operating procedures and 
culture. In the realm of operating procedures, we found 
that for-profit companies based their argumentation for 
SSI particularly on the drawbacks of current “paper 
driven and centralized identity systems” which would 
“benefit from a decentralized digital identity scheme.” 
Government officials shared this view and referred to 
shortcomings of legacy issues in the public sector as the 
“big problem in our times that we are using approaches 
that come from medieval times”, which were “never 
changed” because “people are accustomed to them.” 
Our interviews with experts from Europe and the 
Anglosphere further highlighted the presence of cultural 
differences. Many interviewees mentioned the 
distinction between systems in the Anglosphere which 
are characterized by a tendency of “distrust towards 
anything ‘central’” as opposed to Europe, where central 
registries act “as an authoritative source of truth.” 
Therefore, people in the United States, for instance, 
would be more involved in the discussion on self-
sovereignty than in Europe. As a consequence, the lack 
of discussion around SSI could “give the impression that 
[users] don’t need to rely on any […] authoritative 
source to prove your identity.” 
For the EPs, a frequently recurring theme in our 
data was related to regulatory dynamics, as well as the 
political environment, which was particularly reflected 
in the European legal and political landscape. This is 
because EU regulation, especially in the context of 
transatlantic data transfers, also affects non-European 
stakeholders. As such, non-for-profit and for-profit 
organizations acknowledged the repercussions of the 
GDPR into jurisdictions beyond the EU. Interviewees 
from the private sector argued that despite regulatory 
challenges with the GDPR, there are also opportunities 
for companies that “employ innovative, privacy-
respecting ways.” Interview participants highlighted 
how SSI’s selective disclosure mechanisms would help 
administrations to comply with the GDPR’s principle of 
data minimization. Public officials’ view on this was 
heterogenous. While some acknowledged SSI’s 
potential to facilitate GDPR compliance, others claimed 
that such compliance would not help to establish trust, 
but only be based on “box-ticking”. In another case, 
experts from for-profit companies referred to the 
revision of the European regulation on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic 
transactions (eIDAS), arguing that the open consultation 
was an opportunity to propose “tweaks in the regulation 
that will help […] to establish SSI as one of the key 
factors.” Public officials agreed that eIDAS could 
potentially confer legal validity to a new decentralized 
identity paradigm. With regard to the political 
environment, we noticed a recurring reference among 
interviewees from both the private and the public sector 
to the European Commission’s support and “proactive 
approach” for decentralized digital identity schemes. It 
seemed to be motivated by the ambition to improve 
Europe’s digital competitiveness next to major global 
actors. 
 
  Researcher Not-for-profit For-profit Government 
Organisational 
dimensions 
Operating procedures 0 1 3 4 
Culture 0 3 4 4 
Environmental 
pressures 
Regulatory Dynamics 0 3 4 3 
Political Environment 0 1 2 4 
Table 3. Overview of the institutional properties of SSI’s interpretive flexibility 
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5. Discussion 
Using empirical data from interviews and project 
documentation, we investigated the functional 
boundaries and social dynamics of SSI. While we were 
able to define and map these, we realized that the IF of 
SSI is associated with an underlying institutional 
‘domain’. This domain seems to influence social groups 
and their understandings of SSI. We accounted for this 
third domain in a model that respects both Doherty et 
al.’s [18] two dimensions, as well as Orlikowski’s [19] 
structural approach. Based on these two models, we 
propose an extended model of IF (Figure 3) that builds 
on Doherty et al. [18]. Already accounted for in the 
original model of interpretive flexibility, the arrows A 
and B reflect the duality of technology. That is, how 
human agents shape technology, and in turn, how 
technology influences the actions and behavior of users. 
Here, we investigated how different value sets of 
stakeholders affect the flexible understandings of SSI.  
Our data suggested that underlying institutional 
properties play an important role in stakeholder’s 
interpretation formation. These latent dimensions are an 
important aspect in understanding the social 
construction of IT artifacts, as they go beyond 
stakeholders’ interests and their interest-based 
interpretations. This association is denoted by arrow C. 
Specifically, IT legacy issues were important contextual 
factors for for-profit companies and governments in 
interpreting SSI. As such, they served as a justification 
of service oriented values, such as user convenience, 
data management, and efficiency brought about by SSI. 
Moreover, continental differences regarding the 
perception of SSI seemed to influence stakeholders’ 
diverging interpretations of SSI’s socially and duty 
oriented values. Based on these geopolitical differences, 
not-for-profit and for-profit organizations from the 
Anglosphere often referred to SSI’s potential to re-
establish trust among citizens in centralized institutions. 
On the other end of the spectrum, public officials from 
Europe emphasized the government’s duties as a 
supervisor over citizens. 
We further discovered that regulatory dynamics, 
such as the GDPR and its user-centric focus served as a 
duty oriented premise to increase the legitimacy of SSI.  
Similarly, the revision of eIDAS was used as a tool for 
SSI proponents to voice suggestions to confer legal 
validity to SSI paradigms. Although the actual revision 
did not foresee any adjustments to legally cover SSI 
technologies, it raised the attention of policy-makers 
and allowed to roughly embed a ‘foreign’ SSI construct 
into a European legal context. This observation 
illustrates how underlying legal developments can 
initiate debates about user-centric values such as privacy 
or security, and can then be utilized as tool of 
legitimization in the social construction of technology.  
The political environment also played a role in 
stakeholders’ view on SSI. Our data revealed that 
whenever the idea of SSI was associated with initiatives 
supported by the European Commission, the views on 
SSI became more tangible and concrete. This applied to 
stakeholders in both the private and the public sector.  
Finally, Orlikowski’s [19] work also highlights a 
fourth connection: how a technology could influence 
institutional conditions by “reinforcing or transforming 
structures of signification, domination, and 
legitimation” (arrow D). At this stage, very few SSI 
implementations gained operational foothold in the 
public sector. This makes it difficult to determine to 
what extent SSI technology impacts institutional 
properties. However, to the extent of our knowledge, 
there is one example that underpins this tendency. As 
one of the front-runners of SSI, Germany initiated a 
legal change in its Federal Registration Act with its first 
SSI use-case on hotel check-in procedures which 
proposed the introduction of an “experimentation 
clause” to test further methods of digital registration 
[47]. A similar draft on an experimentation clause was 
ratified for Know-Your-Customer identification 
methods covered by the German Money Laundering 























Act. These regulatory changes created a legal basis for 
wallet-based identity management systems and can 
therefore be considered to have been initiated by SSI.  
The extended model of IF serves to account for 
varying dimensions at-play during the design and 
development of information systems. By analyzing 
contextual institutional factors, stakeholders’ 
interpretations are more traceable and assessable. This 
is especially useful for both digital government 
practitioners and academic scholars, who seek to 
evaluate the history of a new IT artefact and its 
attributed public values. For researchers dealing with 
digital government, the extended model of IF constitutes 
a foundation for further research as a new theoretical 
lens to analyze complex socio-technical IT artefacts. For 
practitioners, the devised model addresses the current 
confusion and ambiguity around SSI by systematically 
unravelling the social, technical, and institutional 
context that influences the understanding of SSI. 
6. Conclusion 
Decentralized identity management systems are a 
relevant but very young topic for governments. 
Unfortunately, vague and value-laden interpretations 
around socio-technical constructs can distort the public 
discourse and risk misrepresenting values and 
affordances that technology can offer to users. To 
unpack the various understandings of SSI on a social, 
technical and institutional level, our study delineated the 
technical boundaries of SSI, mapped its spectrum of 
socio-political ambiguities as novel electronic 
identification paradigm, and provided insights into the 
institutional properties of stakeholders. From a technical 
perspective, we identified the digital wallet as an 
enforcing constraint on the one side, and the centralized, 
siloed storage of identity credentials as a proscribing 
constraint for SSI on the other. In the social domain, the 
most diverging interpretations occurred in duty and 
socially oriented values of SSI. Using Orlikowski’s 
structuration model [19], we identified legacy 
procedures, cultural differences, regulatory dynamics 
and political environments as institutional properties 
that are associated with SSI’s interpretive flexibility. 
Our results allowed us to extend Doherty et al.’s [18] 
model on IF – a multidimensional framework that serves 
to improve the understanding of complex socio-
technical systems. The findings of this study can serve 
as a backbone for future research in this field and 
provide a foundation for policy discussions around SSI.  
However, studying a nascent phenomenon such as 
SSI comes with certain limitations. Because of its 
technical immaturity, we were not able to investigate 
full-fledged implementations and analyze the 
perception of SSI among users as a fifth group of 
stakeholders. Further, due to the limited number of 
people acquainted with SSI, we were only able to 
interview experts that, by definition, have an interest in 
SSI. This may have biased the range of IF to some 
extent. The robustness of the extended model of IF can 
be tested against in future case studies. Likewise, it can 
be worthwhile to consider aspects of critical theory, 
such as the critical capability approach of technology, or 
other theoretical perspectives of technological transition 
or social construction. As such, these limitations 
provide avenues for follow-up research on decentralized 
identity systems that can build on the technical, social, 
or institutional insights on SSI presented in this study. 
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